Abstract
and the logic behind them. Second, best Th art r on analyses of the cost management practice (BMP) options and costs effhstivlenes of three soil erosion cosntrl are specified for representative farm units in a effectiveness of three soil erosion control case study area. Third, an integer programpolicy alternatives, specifically 1) uniformming mdel is emloyed to simulateer prograe rate cost sharing, 2) variable-rate cost sharsmingod strategies ne d allow comparison of ing, and 3) fixed subsidy payments per unit s s an a ing, and 3) fixed subsidy payments per unit their cost effectiveness. Finally, conclusions reduction in erosion. A brief discussion of the thr cost effectiveness. Finally, c onclusions place of these alternative subsidy strategies erosion control policy. within the context of the current policy environment is presented. Integer programming THE SOIL EROSION CONTROL is employed to simulate adoption of "best POLICY ENVIRONMENT management practices" (BMPs) on a set of Though regulatory or tax policy approaches representative farms in a case study waterfor gaining soil erosion control are often anashed in response to these alternative subsidy lyzed (Taylor and Frohberg; Boggess et al.; strategies. Conclusions and policy implicaWalker and Timmons; Spurlock and Clifton; tions are outlined.
or Seale et al.) and calls for mandatory soil erosion control are increasingly heard (Cook; Key words: cost effectiveness, subsidies, cost Epp and Shortle) , subsidization to induce sharing, policy, soil erosion.
voluntary adoption of BMPs appears likely to be the general policy approach for the Soil erosion control policy in the United foreseeable future (Sharp and Bromley; States has received much criticism in recent AAEA Task Force). Subsidy programs have years, with the cost effectiveness of major generally been designed to compensate farprograms being questioned (USGAO). A nummers by an amount equal to or greater than ber of innovative changes in these programs their net BMP cost, that is, gross costs for have been introduced or suggested. This arti-BMP adoption less the economic return from cle reports on comparative analyses of the on-site productivity benefits of soil erosion cost effectiveness of the traditional strategy control, though Michalson and Brooks have of uniform-rate cost sharing to induce volunargued for off-site damages as a basis for subtary adoption of soil erosion control practices sidy amounts. Cost effectiveness in the use of and two alternative subsidy strategies. One is public funds for subsidization is a matter of variable-rate cost sharing, where rates deconcern because these funds are limited. pend on characteristics of the practice and the The question of how to define cost effecfield to which it is applied. The other involves tiveness with regard to soil erosion control offering a fixed subsidy per ton of erosion has received a great deal of attention reduction. The primary hypothesis tested is (USGAO). Ideally, cost effectiveness should that cost effectiveness is improved in shifting be defined in terms of damages avoided, both from uniform-to variable-rate cost sharing to on-and 'off-site. However, given the limitathe fixed subsidy payment approach. What tions on such information, the focus in this follows first is a discussion of the policy enstudy is on cost effectiveness as reflected by vironment in which these alternatives arose cost per unit reduction in the annual average erosion rate based on the Universal Soil Loss result, some ACP funds are now being tarEquation (USLE).
geted to highly erosive watersheds and counThe Agricultural Conservation Program ties. In addition, a pilot Variable Cost-Share (ACP), the primary federal effort to enLevel (VCSL) program is being implemented courage soil erosion control, employs a cost-(USGAO). sharing approach for offering subsidies. UniAs initially designed, one of two forms of the form cost sharing at a 50 percent rate was the VCSL option could be employed by counties. rule until recently, regardless of the parIn one, cost-sharing rates were based on the ticular situation and characteristics of the initial erosion rate and the percentage reducfarmer, the rate of erosion on the field to be tion achieved in the erosion rate. This percenttreated, or the particular BMP to be applied.
age erosion reduction (PER) form was later This is true even though the minimum permodified to consider differing soil loss centage cost-share necessary to induce adoptolerance or T-values across soils, reflecting tion of BMPs may , vary greatly across the idea that a ton of erosion reduction is more farmers, fields, and practices (Mitchell et al.; valuable on some (generally shallow) soils than Johnson et al.) . As a riesult, under uniform cost on other soils, due to the importance of on-site sharing some farmers receive "rents," that is, damages. 1 Percentage reduction, as estimated cost-share payments in excess of their net by pre-and post-practice application of the BMP costs. Walker and Timmons found that USLE, is multiplied by the appropriate under a uniform per acre subsidy approach "weighting" factor (Table 1 ) to arrive at the these "rents" may be quite sizable.
cost-sharing rate. The maximum cost-share In a more formal sense, the inability or unrate allowed is 75 percent. For example, terwillingness of ACP administrators to practice races which reduce the erosion rate on a field perfect price discrimination (i.e., eliminate all with T = 5 from 12 to 6 tons per acre per year "rents") in their role as a monopsonist buyer (a 50 percent reduction) would qualify for 40 of soil erosion control leads to total subsidy percent cost sharing (50 percent x 0.8 = 40 payment costs in excess of the minimum amount percent). necessary to induce any particular level of soil fectiveness. These efforts came in response to Alternatively, participating counties could documentation that in recent years the bulk of choose another form of the VCSL option that cost-sharing funds has been directed toward based cost-sharing rates on the land capability slight erosion problems, where cost per unit of class (LCC) of the field to be treated. In this erosion reduction is relatively high. Only LCC form the cost-sharing rate was set at 28 percent of cost-sharing funds was allocated 45 percent for class I and II land, 55 percent for BMPs on fields estimated to be eroding at for class III land, 65 percent for class IV land, an annual average rate of greater than 10 tons and 75 percent for class VI and VII land. As per acre, where cost per unit of erosion reducunder the other form of the VCSL option, no tion is relatively low (USDA, 1980a) . As a cost sharing was available where soil loss 'According to the Soil Conservation Service, the T-value for a soil represents the maximum soil erosion rate permissible if the soil is to sustain a high level of economical crop productivity for the indefinite future (USGAO).
tolerance was already being met. However, and as it could conceivably evolve in the the LCC form was eliminated as an option future. This study estimates, for a particular after the initial year of the program, apparently watershed, how public cost effectiveness has because of the limited number of counties been or could be affected by marginal changes employing this form and concern about its efwithin the subsidization approach. fectiveness.
The , 1980b) . Analysis of as a percentage of total cost-sharing expendyields for the major soil type in the watershed itures.
suggests that at such an erosion rate soybean The shift from uniform-rate cost sharing to yields may decline as much as three bushels the PER form of the VCSL option represents per acre over a 10-year period (Hunter and a significant step in the direction of a strategy Keller). Water quality data indicate that the which would employ a fixed subsidy payment NFFD River has experienced high levels of per unit of erosion reduction. This is because suspended solids and turbidity and that under this form of the VCSL option, generally aquatic life and recreation criteria have been speaking, the greater the erosion rate reducexceeded for several pollutants. Land damage tion, the higher the cost-sharing rate and subfrom sediment deposition was estimated to sidy payment. A fixed subsidy payment per amount to $175,383 annually for the waterton (SPT) strategy would do so proportionally.
shed (USDA, 1980b) . The appeal of this Pigouvian subsidy strategy Fifteen representative farms were develis in assuring that only BMPs with a public oped on the basis of survey information from a cost per ton of erosion reduction lower than random sample of 76 farm units (10 percent of the subsidy payment per ton would be the total in the NFFD Watershed) and a Soil adopted. As a result, a given amount of eroConservation Service study of the watershed sion reduction would be achieved at lowest (USDA, 1980b) . The farms were differentiated total net BMP costs, though the potential for on the basis of soil type (Grenada/Loring, substantial "rents" would remain. An SPT Lexington-Ruston, Memphis), slope of fields strategy, referred to as the bonus contract ap-(0-2 percent, 2-5 percent, 5-8 percent, 8-12 proach, did appear on the list of alternatives percent), tenure status (owner-operator or developed in the recent Resources Conservarenter), crops (soybeans, wheat, corn), livetion Act review and assessment of soil erosion stock (beef cattle or not), tillage practices (concontrol policy (Brubaker and Castle) .
ventional, reduced, no), and ownership of As noted earlier, a number of studies have earth-moving equipment (yes or no). There compared efficiency, equity, and other atare clearly other factors which influence tributes of tax, subsidy, and regulatory farmers' behavior with regard to adoption of policies for soil erosion control. A few have BMPs, such as farmers' attitudes toward confocused on subsidies and addressed the quesservation and their current financial situation. tion of principles for design of variable subHowever, the above factors are ones which sidies or cost-share rates (Walker and Tim-1) could be expected to substantially affect mons; Michalson and Brooks; Kugler) . This farmers' estimates of gross costs of BMPs and study seeks to address soil erosion control on-site productivity benefits and 2) were policy as it has actually existed and evolved, associated with several as opposed to a single farmer and thus allowed for a reasonably small tionships for major soils in the NFFD Waternumber of representative farm situations.
shed reported in Hunter and Keller. NorTo remain relatively consistent with the malized 1982 prices based on a 10-year trend characteristics of the ACP water quality projof prices received by Tennessee farmers were ect, which required reduction of erosion rates employed. No assumptions were made with to approximately soil loss tolerance, only BMP regard to the possible impact of future techoptions which reduced erosion rates to less nological change. On-site benefits were subthan eight tons per acre per year were contracted from gross costs to arrive at net cost sidered. These BMP options were taken from to the farmer for each BMP on each field. the set available for cost sharing in the projThese productivity benefits differed by soil ect. 3 Erosion rate reductions were estimated type, crop, and prior tillage practice, which inwith the USLE and information specific to fluence the initial erosion rate and thus eroWest Tennessee provided by Jent et al. Fields sion reductions. Owner-operators were with 0-2 percent slop'e required no BMPs to assumed to fully account for productivity achieve soil loss tolerance. Terraces with benefits, while renters were assumed to reduced tillage or no-till without winter cover recognize none. This is admittedly a somewere specified as BMP options for fields with what arbitrary assumption. However, year-to-2-5 percent slope. Terraces with reduced year lease arrangements are relatively comtillage, no-till with winter cover, or establishmon in West Tennessee, so renters' time ment of permanent vegetative cover were horizons can be expected to be relatively specified as BMP options on fields with 5-8
short. This assumption is also consistent with percent slope. Establishment of permanent the very limited participation of rental farm vegetative cover was the only BMP option units in the ACP. considered available on fields with 8-12 perThese gross cost and on-site productivity cent slope.
benefits allowed specification of net costs for Information from Hunter and Keller, each BMP, which indicates the minimum costBlisard and Keller, and Ray and Walch was share payment required to induce voluntary used to develop estimates of gross costs for adoption.
To arrive at what cost-share payapplication of each BMP to each field for a ment would be offered under uniform-rate 10-year period beginning in 1982, discounted cost sharing and the VCSL option, it was also to present value in 1982 dollars at 8 percent. 4 necessary to specify the cost basis for cost Based on discussion with local SCS personnel, sharing, which under the ACP may differ the gross cost of terraces was estimated to be from gross BMP cost. The cost basis for cost 20 percent lower if the operator owned earthsharing in the ACP generally takes into acmoving equipment and thus could be expected count only out-of-pocket expenses. However, to contribute labor with an opportunity cost for permanent vegetative cover establishequal to zero during periods of inactivity. The ment, gross cost must take into account not gross cost of no-till varied by crop and the only out-of-pocket establishment expenses but gross cost for winter cover varied by soil type. also the differences between foregone net The gross cost of permanent vegetative cover returns from row crop production and net establishment differed by livestock enterprise returns from pasture (Ray and Walch) . In and by soil type, given the explicit considerasome cases then, even 100 percent cost shartion of forgone net returns from soybean proing of out-of-pocket establishment expenses duction. Reduced tillage, which was required would not induce voluntary adoption. For noalong with terraces on some fields, was assumed till, just the opposite occurred. The cost basis to involve zero cost, as enterprise budgets of $18 per acre established for cost sharing in show little difference in expected net returns the water quality project was somewhat and many farmers are shifting to reduced above our gross cost estimate, which reflected tillage on their own.
increased out-of-pocket expenses for The present value of on-site productivity chemicals and equipment, but also reduced benefits from reductions in erosion was costs for labor and fuel (Ray and Walch) . For estimated based on soil loss-productivity relafields where winter cover was required with no-till, it was assumed a wheat crop would be decreased from 79 percent to 59 percent if an harvested, and gross BMP cost took this into owner has earth-moving equipment. Also, net account. However, based on ACP rules, no cost per ton generally decreases as slope incost sharing was available for winter cover.
creases using the most cost efficient BMP in Terrace costs estimated by Blisard and Keller each slope class, but BMP field combinations were used to represent both gross BMP cost with lower net cost per ton do not always have and the cost basis for cost sharing. No cost lower minimum cost-share rates. sharing was offered in the special ACP project for reduced tillage.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTEGER The Grenada-Loring soil combination is the PROGRAMMING MODEL dominant one in the watershed and has fields
The information from the previous section with all possible slopes and thus all possible was incorporated into an integer programBMPs. As such, representative information ming (IP) model designed to simulate BMP for this soil combination is provided in Table 2 adoption in response ,to alternative subsidy to indicate how net cost per acre, net cost per strategies. BMP adoption was assumed to octon of erosion reduction, and minimum costcur if the subsidy payment offered was equal share rate (necessary to induce voluntary to or greater than net BMP cost. adoption) vary for the BMPs across field
In general terms, the IP model was strucslopes and operator characteristics. A few iltured as follows: lustrations of the significance of these figures may be helpful. The minimum cost-share rate . m n necessary to induce voluntary adoption of no (1) maximize: CijXi, tillage with winter cover (NT/WC) on a i=lJ=1 5-8 percent slope field is 95 percent for a renter, but 59 percent for an owner due to his n recognition of on-site productivity benefits.
(2) subject to: fljXjF1, The minimum cost-share rate for establish-J=1 ment of permanent vegetative cover (PVC) on a 5-8 percent slope field is 65 percent for an * owner with livestock, but 177 percent for an * owner without livestock due to the assumed lack of any net returns from use for either n pasture or hay production. Enterprise E fmj Xnj Fm budgets for the latter indicate negative J=1 returns given the prices and yields expected in this area (Ray and Walch) . The minimum m n cost-share rate for reduced tillage with ter-
E ncijXij < NC, races (RT/T) on a 5-8 percent slope field is i=lj=l aBase situation is conventional tillage soybeans, except for 2-5% slope fields on farms with livestock where base situation is conventional tillage corn. NT = no tillage; RT = reduce tillage; T = terraces; PVC = permanent vegetative cover; and WC = winter cover. bNCPA = net cost per acre. cMCSR = minimum cost-share rate. dNCPT = net cost per ton. n ptu = the net cost per ton of erosion reduc-(4) E csj X 1 j CS1, tion for application of BMP j to field 
J=l
The objective function (1) involves maximization of total erosion reduction for the NFFD Watershed as a whole. Each BMP-field combination, the (0,1) variable Xij, was specified for an amount of acreage which n depended upon the amount of acreage in the (5) E ptijX1j'PT 1 , watershed represented by the farm unit in j=1l which the field was included. For example, consider application of a BMP to a 20-acre •.
field on a 100-acre farm unit. If this farm unit • .
represented 1,000 acres in the watershed, this • .
BMP-field combination would be specified in the IP model for 200 acres. Erosion reduction, n Cij, and net cost, ci, in constraint set (3) would E ptXmj < PTm, thus be calculated for a 200-acre application of j=1 this BMP. The set of constraints labeled (2) limits each field to one BMP. As discussed below, only one of the constraint sets (3), (4), and (5) is in effect at one time. If more than one BMP satisfies the constraint for any parwhere: ticular field, the one which maximizes erosion reduction is selected. i = 1, .. ., m refers to field number;
The need for the IP approach can be demonstrated by illustrating how constraint set j = 1, . ., n refers to practice number; (4) must function to simulate cost sharing. If 40 percent uniform cost sharing is to be simuXi = a (0,1) variable representing applicalated, CS 1 for field 1 would be specified as .40.
tion of BMP j to field i;
If the lowest minimum cost-share percentage Con = the erosion reduction resulting from among the BMPs applicable to field 1 is 80 perapplication of BMP j to field i; cent for BMP 1, cs 1 would be specified as .80. f l
= 1o
If X 1 , were not a (0,1) activity, X 1 , could enter on a half-field basis to satisfy the constraint. F. = 1;
Thus, an integer programming framework
~with erosion reductions and costs on a wholenc.i = the net cost for application of BMP j field rather than a single-acre basis wasreto field i; quired. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NC = a limit on total net cost; ALTERNATIVE SUBSIDY STRATEGIES The IP model was initially employed to csU = net cost as a percentage of the cost establish the "perfect price discrimination" or basis for cost sharing for application "no rents" baseline. Simulation of BMP adopof BMP j to field i, representing the tion in order of increasing net cost per ton of minimum cost-share percentage necerosion reduction was accomplished by essary to induce voluntary adoption; parametrically varying the right-hand side of the net cost constraint (3) by $100,000 in-CS i = the cost-share percentage offered on crements up to $2.6 million, at which point all field i; 37 fields were treated. Results are presented in Table 3 and the total cost curve is labeled "UNIFORM" in Figure 1 , with individual "BASELINE" in Figure 1 . Twenty "difpoints on the curve identified by cost-share ferent" BMPs were represented, that is, the rate. No BMPs were applied until the costthree basic BMPs (no-till, terraces, and pershare rate reached 30 percent. Information on manent vegetative cover) differentiated by net costs, erosion reductions, cost-share soil, slope, prepractice crop and tillage, payments, public cost per ton, and rents as a tenure, livestock, and equipment characterpercentage of cost-share payments is provided istics. Generally speaking, the order of BMP in Table 4 . application was permanent vegetative cover on higher slopes, followed by no-till, and then terraces with reduced tillage on lower slopes. alternative rates of uniform cost sharing. The right-hand sides for the minimum cost-share Figure 1 . Comparison of the Public Cost Efconstraints (4) were varied parametrically by fectiveness of Alternative Subsidy 10 percent increments from 10 to 90 percent.
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Strategies for BMP Adoption in the The resulting total public (taxpayer) cost NFFD Watershed of West Tencurve for uniform-rate cost sharing is labeled nessee, 1982. 
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The "UNIFORM" curve lies above the is, it is not in the BASELINE set of 20 with "BASELINE" curve for two distinct reasons. lowest net cost per ton. Consider the case of First, as the uniform cost-share rate is inan owner-operator with livestock and earthcreased, rents are paid in cases where BMPs moving equipment growing reduced tillage would have been adopted at a lower cost-share soybeans on Grenada-Loring soil with 5-8 perrate. For example, rents represent 30 percent cent slope. Although net cost per ton for per-($845,000) of cost-share payments at the manent vegetative cover is $0.55 compared to 90 percent cost-share rate. Second, uniform-$1.00 for terraces, the minimum cost-share rate cost sharing results in two types of social rate is 78 percent for permanent vegetative cost inefficiencies. These inefficiencies accover compared to 69 percent for terraces. count for the additional amount by which This is due primarily to the lack of accounting UNIFORM lies above BASELINE, almost for foregone soybean revenue in the cost basis $900,000 at the 90 percent cost-share rate, for for cost sharing on permanent vegetative example.
cover. This type of social cost inefficiency The first type of social cost inefficiency could also occur without a divergence between associated with uniform-rate cost sharing the cost basis for cost sharing and gross cost. stems from the order of BMP adoption. Net cost per ton, an estimate of social cost, is not
The Varable Cost-Share Level Option perfectly correlated with minimum cost-share
To simulate the Variable Cost-Share Level rate across BMPs. For example, adoption of (VCSL) option, the right-hand sides for the no-till (from conventional till) corn by an -minimum cost-share constraints (4) were set owner-operator on Grenada-Loring soil with at levels dictated by each of the two forms 2-5 percent slope has the 15th highest net cost (PER and LCC). The simulation of the perper ton among the 20 BMPs in the BASEcentage erosion reduction (PER) form LINE solution but is adopted third in the resulted in just one point in terms of total UNIFORM solution with a minimum costpublic cost and erosion reduction, rather than share rate of 32 percent. This result is due a curve. The same was the case for the land primarily to the fact that the cost basis for capability class (LCC) form. (See Table 5 and cost sharing is well above gross cost as esti- Figure 1 .) Based on extrapolation between the mated for this study, though such a divergence 60 percent and 70 percent cost-share levels on is not necessary for uniform-rate cost sharing UNIFORM, total public cost under the PER to generate an inefficient order of BMP adoptform of the VCSL option was 10.6 percent ion in terms of social cost. In addition, renting lower than under a 69.4 percent uniform costleads to this type of social cost inefficiency if share rate. This increased cost effectiveness on-site benefits assumed to be unrecognized was primarily due to cost-share rates under by renters are considered a social benefit. the PER form of only 59 percent for no-till That is, less cost efficient BMPs will be (from conventional till) corn on Grenada soil adopted by owner-operators before most cost with 2-5 percent slope, which was still high efficient BMPs by renters.
enough to induce adoption. Public cost under The second type of social cost inefficiency the LCC form was 6.6 percent higher than associated with uniform-rate cost sharing under a 57 percent uniform cost-share rate. stems from adoption of a BMP which is not the The reduced cost effectiveness in this case socially cost efficient BMP for the field; that was primarily due to cost-share rates under LCC of 75 percent for permanent vegetative cost efficient order of BMP application is not cover on 8-12 percent sloping fields of farms followed. Under both forms, the top three with livestock, when only 26 percent to 31 perranked BMPs from the BASELINE set are cent cost-share rates were required to induce included but the next most highly ranked adoption.
BMP under either form is the 12th one. It is of interest to note that public cost A Fixed Subsidy Payment Per Unit Reduction under the PER form of the VCSL option i i i would have been lower and thus even more s p r o ie would have been lower and thus even more Finally, to simulate a strategy offering a fixed cost effective relative to uniform-rate cost subsidy payment per unit reduction in erosharing, had the weighting factors in the costsion, the right-hand sides of the net cost per share rate formula not been modified to reton constraint set (5) were varied paraflect differing T-values. An initial set of metrcally from $.10 per ton f erosion reducsimulations was done prior to this T-value tion to $1.50 in increments of $.10. Results are modification, which essentailly increased costpresented in Table 6 for the simulations up to share rates for soils with T-values of less than $1.00. The curve rereesenting this strategy is five. This modification led to BMP application labeled SPT in Figure , ith individual points on several fields with slopes of 2-5 percent, as identified by the subsidy payment per ton of well as higher cost-share rates on several erosion reduction. The SPT strategy secures fields on which BMPs were applied at the the same erosion reduction as 50 percent original rates before the modification. Total uniform-rate cost share rates at 20.3 percent erosion reduction increased by 17 percent as a lower public cost, the same erosion reduction result of the modification, but at a marginal as 75 percent uniform-rate cost sharing at 29.2 cost of $1.187 per ton erosion reduction, percent lower public cost. almost three times the average cost of $.441
The lower costs under SPT result exclusively for the erosion reduction gained with the from elimination of the social cost inefficiencies original weighting factors of the PER form.
in terms of the BMP set and order of adoption. Another basis for evaluating the VCSL opRents are actually 16 percent greater under tion is to compare public cost per ton of ero-SPT than with 50 percent uniform-rate cost sion reduction under the PER and LCC forms sharing and 17 percent greater under SPT with that of 75 percent uniform cost sharing than with 75 percent uniform-rate cost shar-(as indicated by the point labeled "75" in ing. The reason for the higher rents is il- Figure 1) , which is the rate generally paid in lustrated by the following comparisons. Total targeted water quality projects. Given the erosion reduction with a 30 percent uniform maximum 75 percent cost-share rate in the cost-share rate and total erosion reduction VCSL option, PER and LCC would be viewed with a $.10 per ton fixed subsidy payment are as offering reduced rates of cost sharing for approximately equal, as are total erosion BMP application on less highly erosive land.
reduction with a 90 percent uniform costThough erosion reduction would be 18 percent share rate and total erosion reduction with a lower under PER as compared to 75 percent $.60 per ton fixed subsidy payment (Figure 1 ). uniform-rate cost sharing, public cost per ton Thus, to secure the higher of these two levels of erosion reduction for PER would be 13 perof total erosion reduction under UNIFORM cent lower, $.55 compared to $.63. Though eroby inducing additional BMP adoption with a sion reduction would be 42 percent lower 90 percent cost-share rate, farmers who would under LCC as compared to uniform-rate cost have participated at the lower 30 percent costsharing, public cost per ton of erosion reducshare rate would receive three times the tion for LCC would be 33 percent lower, $.42 minimum payment necessary to induce adopcompared to $.63. Similar comparisons could tion. On the other hand, to secure this higher be made with the typical 50 percent uniformlevel of total erosion reduction under SPT, rate cost sharing of the ACP. some farmers would receive six times ($.60 Points representing both forms of the VCSL versus $.10) the minimum payment necessary option lie well above the BASELINE curve in to induce adoption. 29 than PER and 38 percent less than LCC. fluencing farmers' perceptions of net BMP cost and decision rules for BMP adoption, relative to off-site damages. However, a commust be recognized. However, the primary prehensive evaluation of the PER form would purpose of the study was not to estimate the require consideration of the increased adactual cost of gaining particular amounts of ministrative costs incurred in estimating eroerosion control, but rather to estimate the sion rates anderosion reductions. Conclusions relative cost effectiveness of alternative subabout the advisability of expanding variable sidy strategies. Violation of assumptions could cost sharing within the ACP must await affect absolute magnitudes of costs greatly, evaluation of actual field experience in parbut relative cost differences to a much lesser ticipating counties. Whether variable cost degree. As such, the following conclusions and sharing can develop and maintain acceptability policy implications appear appropriate.
is uncertain because it appears to "reward" Uniform-rate cost sharing imposes a subthose farmers who practice less erosion constantial limitation on the cost effectiveness of trol. In addition, its effectiveness may be federal soil erosion control policy because limited because both farmers and SCS techminimum cost-share rates necessary to induce nicians may have some incentive to see a BMP adoption differ widely by BMP and higher initial erosion rate generated or to err across land and operator characteristics. At on the high side in the judgments necessary in the typical 50 percent rate of cost sharing, the specifying factors in the Universal Soil Loss combination of rents and social inefficiencies Equation (USLE). A high research priority is, in the BMP set served to more than double thus, analysis of the VCSL option with actual public cost per ton of erosion reduction program participation data. relative to the theoretical minimum, ignoring
The SPT strategy offering a fixed subsidy administrative costs. The social cost inefficienpayment per ton of erosion reduction resulted cies resulted primarily from using out-ofin substantial increases in public cost effecpocket expenses as the cost basis for cost tiveness relative to uniform-rte cost sharing~~s h ~aring.
^ and the VCSL option, supporting the primary The PER form of the VCSL option modestly hypothesis of the study. This occurred priincreased public cost effectiveness relative to marily due to elimination of social-cost ineffiuniform-rate cost sharing, supporting the ciencies in the BMP set rather than from a primary hypothesis of the study, while the reduction in rents. Thus, the SPT strategy discontinued LCC form actually reduced may be viewed as a way of dealing with the public cost effectiveness. The increase in out-of-pocket expense problem. The feasibility public cost effectiveness with the PER form of such a strategy has been increased by imwould have been greater with the original plementation of, and several years experience weighting factors, as the T-value modificawith, the VCSL option, which broke the tions resulted in relatively high marginal costs "uniformity" barrier, both philosophically and for reductions in erosion on fields with administratively, and relies on estimation of T-values less than five and slight erosion proberosion rates with the USLE. However, the lems. Whether this trade-off is justified cost "sharing" approach surely maintains a depends upon the value of on-site damages good deal of sanctity even yet.
An SPT strategy clearly has attractive BMP adoption, rents in total public costs for features if cost effectiveness is measured erosion reduction could be largely eliminated. strictly in terms of public cost per ton of eroResearch on the expected performance of sion reduction. The T-value modifications in such a bidding scheme within the ACP would the weighting factors for the PER form of the be useful. VCSL option reflect the idea that cost effecThe evident willingness on the part of ACP tiveness should be defined more broadly. Difadministrators to consider and even experifering on-site damages could be reflected ment with innovative subsidy strategies similarly in an SPT strategy by specifying portends well for future improvements in the higher payment levels for soils with lower cost effectiveness of federal soil erosion con-T-values. trol policy. As could be expected, the growing The establishment of the Conservation demand for accountability with regard to the Reserve Program for retirement of highly product of programs like the ACP and the ineroding cropland by the Food Security Act of creasing scarcity in real terms of the basic 1985 suggests that a bidding approach for cost resource in this particular production process, sharing on all BMPs could be politically viable.
funds for technical assistance and cost sharIf farmers' bids approached their minimum ing, together are serving to induce significant cost-share rate required to induce voluntary institutional change in this policy area.
